STUDY ON THE LONG-TERM INCENTIVE MECHANISM OF THE LARGE-SCALE DREDGING PROJECT

Bin Zhou, Zigang Zhang

2011

Abstract

Through the principal-agent theory and game theory, this article has established the long-term income model of the large-scale dredging project, which has obtained the solution of the long-term incentive model, analyzed the impact of the dynamic consistency as well as pledge and negotiating cost to incomes of the principal and agent by means of increasing different constraint conditions. Furthermore, the study also shows that the long-term incentive model can provide the agent with stronger incentive.

Paper Citation

in Harvard Style

Zhou B. and Zhang Z. (2011). STUDY ON THE LONG-TERM INCENTIVE MECHANISM OF THE LARGE-SCALE DREDGING PROJECT . In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems - Volume 4: PMSS, (ICEIS 2011) ISBN 978-989-8425-56-0, pages 574-580. DOI: 10.5220/0003591905740580

in Bibtex Style

@conference{pmss11,
author={Bin Zhou and Zigang Zhang},
title={STUDY ON THE LONG-TERM INCENTIVE MECHANISM OF THE LARGE-SCALE DREDGING PROJECT},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems - Volume 4: PMSS, (ICEIS 2011)},
year={2011},
pages={574-580},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0003591905740580},
isbn={978-989-8425-56-0},
}

in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems - Volume 4: PMSS, (ICEIS 2011)
TI - STUDY ON THE LONG-TERM INCENTIVE MECHANISM OF THE LARGE-SCALE DREDGING PROJECT
SN - 978-989-8425-56-0
AU - Zhou B.
AU - Zhang Z.
PY - 2011
SP - 574
EP - 580
DO - 10.5220/0003591905740580