

# AN IMPROVED HIGH-DENSITY KNAPSACK-TYPE PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM

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**Abstract:** Almost all knapsack-type public key cryptography has been proven unsafe. To solve this problem, more secure public key cryptographic algorithms are urgently needed. This article first discusses the basic theory of knapsack-type public key and methods that used to attack the knapsack public key. Then, it analysis the literature (Wang & Hu 2006, p.2930), and points out the potential defects of its cryptography safety. Meanwhile, the article gives out an improved algorithm, and discusses the safety and efficiency of the algorithm. The analysis of the algorithm shows that the improved algorithm is better than the original one in security.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

There are many insecure factors on the file transformation or e-mail business dealings on the Internet , the computer security has thus become a very important research area.

But, the key transmission and custody issues of symmetric cryptography can not be solved today.

Public key encryption algorithm separates the public key and the private key, so that it successfully resolved the key transmission and custody issues. However, the speed of public key cryptographic algorithm is a serious constraint bottlenecks in their applications (Yasuyuki, Masao & Takeshi 2008, p. 357).

In response to these issues, this article did a useful exploration and research on the fast public key encryption system and the chaotic system used in the public key algorithm.

## 2 THE CORRELATION THEORY OF KNAPSACK PUBLIC KEY

Description of knapsack problem: Given a bunch of objects with different mass, is it possible if we get a portion of these objects and put them in a knapsack, in order to make the mass of the

knapsack equals to a given value?

### 2.1 Problem

The solution to the super increasing knapsack problem can be easily found, that compare the total mass with the largest number in the sequence, if the total mass is smaller than this number, it is out of the knapsack; if the total mass is larger than this number, and it belongs to the knapsack. Then, make the mass of knapsack minus this number, and afterwards study the second largest number in the sequence. Repeat the process till the end. If the total mass becomes 0, then there exists one solution, otherwise, there is no solution. Here is a simple flow chart show in Fig1:




Figure1: The flow chart which solve the Super-increasing sequence of Knapsack.

At present, most of the public key algorithms are constructed based on sum of the set problem, due to that this structure is simple, with lower complexity in computation, and can efficiently solve the problem of the efficiency of algorithm. Merkle-Hellman encryption algorithm in Knapsack has many deformations. Besides, there is also a Chor-Rivest encryption in Knapsack, which is the only known public encryption algorithm without using the AB mod form to disguise as a easy sum of the set problem.

### 2.2 Decipher of Knapsack Public Key Algorithm

The strongest attack to the encryption algorithm in knapsack that known is  $L^3$ -Lattice base reduction algorithm which was first proposed by A.Shamir and had been improved by many scientists. This method reduces the subset sum problem by making it into to find a short vector in a lattice.

Definition of subset sum density: Let us suppose that  $S = \{s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n\}$  is a Knapsack set. The density of Knapsack set is defined as

$$d = \frac{n}{\max \{ \log_2 S_i \mid 1 \leq i \leq n \}}$$

Let  $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n \in R^n$ , then  $L = \{ \sum_{i=1}^n k_i b_i \mid k_i \in Z \} = \sum_{i=1}^n k_i b_i$  is the subset of n-dimensional space  $R^n$ .

Among them, R is the real number set, and Z is integer set, and we call L a lattice.  $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n \in R^n$  is a set of bases of lattice L, n is the rank of lattice L. A lattice can have many different bases, among which the vector included has relatively shorter length is called reduced. Here is any n linear independence vectors  $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n \in R^n$ , and constructs a set of bases of lattice L:  $b_1^*, b_2^*, \dots, b_n^*$ , among which

$$b_1^* = b_1; \quad b_i^* = b_i - \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} \frac{b_i \cdot b_j^*}{b_j^* \cdot b_j^*} b_j^* \quad (i > 1).$$

Let  $\mu_{ij} = \frac{b_i \cdot b_j^*}{b_j^* \cdot b_j^*} \quad (i > j)$ , if a set of bases  $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n \in R^n$  of lattice L simultaneously satisfies the following two conditions:

- 1)  $|\mu_{ij}| \leq \frac{1}{2}, \quad i > j;$
- 2)  $\|b_i^* + \mu_{i,i-1} b_{i-1}^*\|^2 \geq \frac{3}{4} \|b_{i-1}^*\|^2, \quad (i > 1);$

Then we call  $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n \in R^n$  a set of reduction bases of lattice L. And the  $L^3$ -lattice base reduction algorithm gradually constructs a set of reduction bases  $b_1^*, b_2^*, \dots, b_n^*$  through  $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n$ . It is an algorithm of polynomial time.

Here is the method that cracks the knapsack problem using the  $L^3$ -lattice base reduction algorithm. Let us suppose  $s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n, C$  are positive integers, now we solve the 0-1 vector  $x = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$  whose length is n and makes  $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i s_i = C$ .

**Step1.** Take a set of bases of lattice L:

$$b_1 = (1, 0, 0, \dots, 0, -s_1), \quad b_2 = (0, 1, 0, \dots, 0, -s_2), \quad \dots, \quad b_n = (0, 0, 0, \dots, 1, -s_n),$$

$$b_{n+1} = (0, 0, 0, \dots, 0, C)$$

**Step2.** Seek the reduction base  $b_1^*, b_2^*, \dots, b_n^*, b_{n+1}^*$  of L using the  $L^3$ -algorithm;

**Step3.** If for any  $b_i^* = (b_{i,1}^*, b_{i,2}^*, \dots, b_{i,n}^*, b_{i,n+1}^*)$  that all  $b_{ij}^* = 0$ , or there exists a constant  $\lambda, \quad (1 \leq j \leq n)$  making

it has a solution of  $x_j = \frac{1}{\lambda} b_{i,j}^* \quad i \leq j \leq \lambda$ , then stops, otherwise turn to **Step 4**;

**Step4.**  $C = \sum_{i=1}^n a_i - C$ , repeat **Step 1** to **Step 3**, and

get the solution  $x = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$ , then the solution of the original knapsack problem

is  $(1 - x_1, 1 - x_2, \dots, 1 - x_n)$ .

Because the knapsack set density of super-increasing sequence in knapsack must less than 1, or there will be multiple solutions. And when the knapsack set density of super-increasing sequence in knapsack  $d < 0.94$ , the success rate of cracking the knapsack using the  $L^3$ -lattice base reduction algorithm is very high. Lagrias-Odlyzko and Brickell will both independently proved that it is completely possible to crack the knapsack problem when  $d < 0.64$  (Fleshwound 2009.10). For the multiple iterated knapsack encryptions, each time it iterated will lower the density of knapsack set, when it reaches a certain times, the success rate of the  $L^3$ -lattice base reduction algorithm be greatly improved. So, it is not advisable to use the multiple iterated methods.

### 3 IMPROVE THE ALGORITHM

#### 3.1 Analysis of the Original Algorithm

In the literature (Wang & Hu 2006, p.2930), the author proposed a tractable knapsack problem.

The author used this knapsack problem to design the limit of the door knapsack public-key algorithms. The basic idea is to produce backpack sequence which meets the above conditions. Certain degree of transformations is used for the sequence, such as modular multiplication transformation. And such sequence after the transformation can be considered as the public key. Through the author's analysis, the efficiency and safety of this public key algorithm were very high.

But, we need to explain that, first, the essence of tractable knapsack problem, which is proposed by the author, is still based on the super-increasing knapsack problem, nothing but the author conceals the super-increasing sequence  $d_i$ . There are no essential differences between releasing the knapsack as a public key directly and MH public key algorithm; second, it is not easy for the algorithm to produce the knapsack vector. The author puts forward a method: pick up

(repeatable)  $n$  numbers  $g_1, \dots, g_n$  randomly from  $U = \{14, 17, 19, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 37, 38, 39,$

$40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48\}$ , let  $d_i = \prod_{k=i}^n g_k$ ,

then randomly select  $n-1$  numbers  $h_2, \dots, h_n$  which are all relatively prime to  $g_1, \dots, g_n$ . Let  $a_1 = d_1, a_i = h_i d_i, i=2, \dots, n$ . The  $a_i$  we get meets the requirements. But, the author uses octal plaintext when construct the algorithm (That is why the elements of  $U$  are no larger than 49), because we select  $g_i$  from  $U$  only, the variation of the parameters is limited, this may bring potentially risk to secret key.

#### 3.2 The Flow Chart of the Improved Algorithm




Figure 2: The flow chart of the improved algorithm.

#### 3.3 Produce the Secret Key

Select knapsack vector  $S = (s_1, \dots, s_n)$  randomly, which meets the requirements that  $d_1 = s_1, d_i = \gcd(s_i, d_{i-1}), d_n = \gcd(s_n, d_{n-1}) = 1$ , select a random replacement  $f$  to replace the knapsack vector  $S$ ,

and we get the replaced knapsack vector  $S'$ . Randomly select vector  $a=(a_1, \dots, a_n)$ ,  $b=(b_1, \dots, b_n)$ , which makes  $s'_i = a_i + b_i$ . Randomly

select mode number  $p > \sum_{i=1}^n a_i$ ,  $q > \sum_{i=1}^n b_i$ , and produce secret parameters  $v, w$  which meets the requirements  $\gcd(v,p)=1, \gcd(w,q)=1$ , that makes  $v$  and  $w$  have inverse element of modulo  $p$  and modulo  $q$ .

Let  $\alpha_i = v a_i \pmod{p}$ ,  $\beta_i = w b_i \pmod{q}$   
 The public key and private key we get are as follows:

Public key:  $\alpha = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n)$ ,  $\beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_n)$   
 Private key:  $s, v, w, p, q, a, b, f$

## 4 ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHM

### 4.1 Computational Complexity Analysis

Let us suppose the binary length of the plaintext  $M$  is  $k$ , the binary length of vector  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are approximately  $k$ . We need to calculate  $E_p =$

$$\sum_{i=1}^n m_i \alpha_i, E_q = \sum_{i=1}^n m_i \beta_i \text{ to encrypt. But the}$$

computation of encryption is linear, so the computation's complexity of encryption is  $O(k)$ . The complexity of encrypt time is  $2O(k)$ . We know that the complexity of encryption's computation of the traditional public key encryption algorithm RSA(Rives, Gau & Adleman 1978, p.120), ElGamal(Guan 1987, p.51) are 3 powers.

During the decryption process, the improved algorithm needs to calculate  $M_p = v^{-1} E_p \pmod{p}$  and  $M_q = w^{-1} E_q \pmod{q}$ , and respectively used one degree modular multiplication and one degree computation of inversion. That is to say, the complexity of this

section is  $O(k^2)$ . Besides, according to

$$x_i \equiv [(s - \sum_{j=i+1}^n a_j x_j) / d_i] (a_i / d_i)^{-1} \pmod{d_{i-1} / d_i},$$

we also need to make  $n$ -times multiplication and  $n$ -times division, the complexity of these computations is one degree, which is  $O(nk)$ . In addition, we also need to carry out  $n$ -times modular multiplication, whose complexity is  $O(nk^2)$ . Finally, the complexity of  $f$ 's inverse replacement is linear, and it can be ignored. The strict complexity of decryption's computation is  $O(nk) + O(k^2) + O(nk^2)$ . So, the complexity of decryption's computation is  $O(nk^2)$ , which is still smaller when it compared to  $O(k^3)$ . Meanwhile, the complexity of the improved decrypt computation is at the same index level of that in the original text.

### 4.2 Security Analysis

1) Secret key security: according to  $s = a + b$ , at least we can randomly get a complete random sequence from  $a$  and  $b$ . Assume that  $a$  is generated totally randomly, then  $b = s - a$ . Public key  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are created from two irrelevant modules.  $\alpha$  is completely random, which implies that  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are completely random sequence for the attacker. We can say that the attacker can not get  $s$  through  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ . Then we can avoid the potentially risk that the knapsack vector would be released directly as a public key.

2) Defend low-density subset sum attack (Coster, Joux, LaMacchia, et al 1992, p.111):

In the knapsack problem, the knapsack density of knapsack vector  $S$  is usually defined as the followings:

$$d = \frac{n}{\max(\log_2 s_i | 1 \leq i \leq n)}$$

According to the  $L^3$  - lattice base reduction algorithm, if this algorithm can always get a base that includes the shortest non-zero lattice vector,

and when  $d < 0.9408$ , the rate of effective attack is very high. The attack can use lattice as follows:

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & \dots & 0 & ms_1 \\ \cdot & & \cdot & \cdot \\ 0 & \dots & 1 & ms_n \\ \frac{1}{2} & \dots & \frac{1}{2} & mS \end{pmatrix}$$

Among them, select the suitable integer  $m$ , satisfies  $m > \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{n}$ . The dimension lattice of the

matrix is  $(n+1)$ ,  $S = \sum_{i=1}^n s_i x_i$ . Considering the

infinite extension: Let's make it that the size of  $s_i$  is  $L$  bits, suppose the size of  $a$  is similar with  $s$ ,

which is also  $L$  bits. According to  $p > \sum_{i=1}^n a_i$ , the size of modulus  $p$  is  $L + \log_2 n$ , when  $L > n - \log_2 n$ , then  $d > 1$ , that is  $C_p$  can defend LDA attack; For the similar reason,  $C_q$  can defend LDA attack.

**4.3 Some Comparison to the Original Algorithm**

1) The original algorithm has some restrictive conditions to produce a certain backpack vector: select  $n$  parameters from  $U = (14,17,19, 22,23,26,28,29,30,31,34,37,38,39,40, 41,42,43,44, 46,47,48)$  to further generate backpack vector. This brought the key space so small, although the parameters selected from the  $U$  should be multiplied with the random parameter  $h$  before it's used to be the knapsack vector  $S$ , it can not be eliminated that the key constraints on  $U$ , because the elements of  $S$  will be the multiples of the corresponding elements of  $U$ . In the improved algorithm, knapsack vector is generated from the multiplication of two completely random numbers, so the key security issues of original algorithm is

well solved.

2) The improved algorithm is based on the ease of solution of the original algorithm knapsack problem, so the efficiency of encryption and decryption are equal to the original algorithm. There is a problem that the speed of decryption is slow in this algorithm and the original one. We can see the efficiency between this algorithm and the traditional RSA (Rivest, Shamir & Adleman 1978, p.120) and other mode refers to operation is more or less the same, which is made by the complexity of making knapsack problem. In addition, the original algorithm generates knapsack vector quickly at the expense of the key security. Although the security of the key algorithm has been required higher in the improved algorithm, the terms  $0 \leq x \leq k-1$  should be met still, so there are still some limitations during the key generating.

**5 CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT**

This paper introduces the basic theory of knapsack-type public key cryptography, and the strongest attacking method to this public key cryptography. Then, the article analysis the literature (Wang & Hu 2006, p.2930), pointing out the potential defects of the security of secret key, and gives the improved method, discusses its safety and efficiency, and finally obtains the conclusion that on the premise of same efficiency, the safety is better than the original algorithm.

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