

Setting Up a Center for the Study of Political Parties and Local Government

Can We Work Together?

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Abstract: Last April 2017, Udayana University initiated a Focus Group Discussion for establishing a political parties clinic in Denpasar. Two other universities (Warmadewa and Undiknas), 3 political parties, the AIPI (Asosiasi Ilmu Politik Indonesia) plus a number of selected NGO are participated. However, the political parties as a group showed no enthusiasm: only seven political party cadres participated. Following the FGD failure, the research team decided to conduct a related survey in May-June 2017, and interviewed 61 cadres from eleven political parties. The findings of this survey, 31 cadres wrote that a clinic is necessary and 30 cadres wrote either unnecessary or do not know. Mietzner (2008) defines political actors in authoritarian or illiberal regimes, crucial institutions such as the military, political parties and that bureaucracy are often dependent on financial patronage, they are reluctant to get financial audit, be cleaner and act as agent of change. The findings of the FGD and of the follow up survey show that whatever the academics might do to embrace political parties, they ignore and disequilibrium all collaborative work. Instead of talking of "clinic", it would be probably better then to set up a center for the study of political parties and local governments.

1 INTRODUCTION

Last mid-April to June 2017, a team of researchers from the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Udayana University plus Warmadewa University and Undiknas/University of National Education conducted a Focus Group Discussion/FGD followed by a survey on political parties related to the formation of political party clinics in Denpasar City. The FGDs, accompanied by a survey, were unexpectedly negative, means that social and political organisations such as military, political parties and those bureaucracy as Mietzner (2008) proclaim they undermine their own professionalism, functional effectiveness and internal coherence, and obstruct Indonesia's process of democratic consolidation. FGD results indicated that the general view of the public regarding political parties has been declared as not transparent and accountable, was denied by FGD participants from two political parties cadres who describing their party as transparent, accountable and not using political dowry.

Academics focus of attention in this research tend to seek for the future existence of a political party clinic in a sense of political parties to be transparently and accountably managed. According to the parties

cadre presence in the FGD, it has been done during the internal meeting of political parties. From their point of view, that way is enough to run transparency and accountability. While at this moment, the general public wants more published financial report, a clear working program with operational guidelines that take the interests of the people. Political cadres see no such interest in publications nor to form public perception on what are transparency and accountability of political parties mean for public.

According to the cadres presented, all these functions have been running well. However, some of them stated that there are still political parties that have not performed these functions well. The collapse on the institutional function of the Political Parties having impacts in all directions has been rejected in this focus group discussion. According to their cadres, the demise of these functions is more due to the current regulatory rules related to the problems in the elections. Regulations that allow free fighting systems such as those that are currently running make political parties difficult to perform their functions well. Thus, for them the greatest error that exists today correlate to the system of regulation that governs the political party in the election process.

2 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON DATA

The question is why since the beginning neither the political parties cadres play fair election nor their members sitting in the chamber and parliament trying to improve the condition. So that changes in the composition of seats acquired in the 2009 and 2014 elections in Bali can also be the material for analyzing the expected lacking of quality among cadres. Seats available were 55 as remain the same from 2009 to 2014 for DPRD/Bali province (all districts and a city of Denpasar).

The number of seats located for 2014 election has changed in Badung, Tabanan, Buleleng, Karangasem and Gianyar. Buleleng on the other hand got 2 more seats in comparison to previous election and also one additional seat for Karangasem. However, each of Badung, Tabanan, and Gianyar electoral districts get one seat less. Before 2014 election time, some mass organisations from Buleleng (affiliated as Buldog/Buleleng dogen) and Karangasem tried with all means to elect their cadres as winners.

Table 1: Dapil/electoral districts and Parliamentary (DPRD) Seats Available for Bali Province in 2014

Dapil and DPRD Kab/Kota in 2014 based on SK KPU No.109/Kpts/KPU/year 2013		
Dapil		Seats
Bali 1	Denpasar	8
Bali 2	Badung	6
Bali 3	Tabanan	6
Bali 4	Jembrana	4
Bali 5	Buleleng	12
Bali 6	Bangli	3
Bali 7	Karangasem	7
Bali 8	Klungkung	3
Bali 9	Gianyar	6
9		55

Source: KPU Province Bali, 2014.

The KPU data in table 1 presentation above is aiming for justifying that as soon the available seats released in each Dapil, then hundreds of cadres may run for wining. Despite their lack of political integrity, nor they have political will to educate themselves as Mietzner (2008) said even in the era of Suharto (New Order) political party is weakened by bureaucratic institution through authoritarian rule, pressure of economic interest and corruption attitude. Furthermore, in Post Suharto era, political party condition did not go far. The attitude of political party actors tend to enrich themselves as the accumulation

of political capital and still collaborate with bureaucrat (executive).

3 DATA FINDINGS

FGD carried out earlier than the survey activities add to the strong argumentation that shows political party has not changed. Political parties in Indonesia in general from time to time, since the regime of the new order era until the era of reform at present cannot change themselves, thus allowing themselves to be hijacked by the power of the political oligarchic elites to come to power and treat the political party as their own.

Regardless of these research team findings, another failure is the inconsistency in showing identity of political cadre as a fighter of public interest. Political parties are always among the interests of desires to continue to stand up as an opposition or driven to rotate the direction and find shelter under the armpits of the ruling regime. So that the Political Parties cannot be independent and always be under and intervened by the executive.

As further elaborated by Mietzner (2008) that the political parties, on the other hand, had been institutionally weakened by 40 years of authoritarian rule, making them vulnerable to external pressure, economic interests and corruption. In addition, the decision of President Habibie in June 1998 to lift all restrictions immediately on the establishment of political parties created by political actors, forcing them to raise funds quickly to create their own parties.

The bureaucracy, for its part, had a long tradition of financing itself through huge numbers of off budget accounts, filled with monies derived from political patrons, entrepreneurs and corrupt practices. In short, the deeply entrenched habit of illicit fund-raising in the military, the parties and the bureaucracy posed a serious challenge to Indonesia's post-authoritarian governments, with each of these three actors playing an important role in determining the success or failure of the democratic transitions.

It can be understood as well that the political party's unwillingness to attempt the establishment of the Clinic of political parties and the failure of the party to reform itself because it is more to the question of whether this will benefit them or not. As it is commonly known the nature of political parties will pursue power and even accumulate power as much as possible. Such testimony can be felt in the phenomenon of the presence of political parties in various aspects of power. The phenomenon or more precisely we call this "political party octopus" as we almost find from all the joints of the nation's life. Any

follow-up cannot be separated from the interference of political parties. Octopus figure of Political parties aims at getting into the niche of the nation's life, as seen by several attempt to weaken the KPK (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi*/Eradication Commission of Corruption) by Political party who disrupt the bureaucratic system via its 'hak angket/parliament enquire'.

3.1 Survey Results

Referring to the result of the survey by the research team, after the validity test and the reliability of the instrument passed in the initial model of SEM (Figure 1) there is a score value that varies after the items of the question are combined. This survey analysis proceeds to the second part of SEM/ Structural Equation Modeling that is the measurement model (Figure 2) to describe the variables of regulation and change financial statements as a reflection of the latent variables of democracy and the need for clinic of Political Parties.

In the following initial SEM analysis, the variables shown are represented as:

Regulation is the average scores of questions in var A which covering score (1 to 5) in understanding of the rules of the game (Institution) and regulation of information for the public.

Democracy is a composite of the average score in var B which covering score (1 to 5) Party's bargaining position and understanding of the positions of parties (democracy).

Finance is a combination of the average score in var C which covering score (1 to 5) in understanding of financial governance and Financial Report.

Clinic of Political Parties is the level of clinical importance of political parties in var D which covering score (1 to 5) negative to positive level of need for political parties clinic for all 61 respondents.




Figure 1: Initial model of SEM.

Diagram above shows the average coefficient of a combined score of questions around regulation (variable A) for setting up a clinic for political parties (variable D) is very significant ($P < 0,01$) to reject the null hypothesis that is political parties don't need a

clinic that is formed by three universities in Denpasar. Meanwhile a combined score of regulation (variable A) with report score and financial management (variable C) brings out P count= 0, 11 that means there is significance connection to receive a working hypothesis. Significant coefficient $P > 0,01$ receives working hypothesis that is political parties need a clinic on a combined score of the change of financial report (variable C) with political parties shows P count= 0,41.

Direct connection of regulation (variable A) with finance (variable B) brings out P count = 0,11 that means a weak connection. SEM analysis for a combined score of regulation (variable A) to a combined score of democracy (variable B) shows P count = 0,05 with negative P alpha value, example - 0.19 indicates a significant rejection on the null hypothesis that the research said that the political parties don't need a clinic. The value of $P < 0.01$ with negative alpha~ (030) the average of a combined score of regulation (variable A), finance (variable B) and democracy (variable B) as the part of measurement model to set up a clinic for political parties (variable D) the significant coefficient has rejected the null hypothesis. Variable B is the average score combination of the answers of questions around democracy with count score of significant coefficient of a clinic for political parties is very low ($p < 0.01$) that rejects the need of a clinic of political parties. Maybe the democracy variable in the questionnaire becomes the most difficult question for political party cadres who become the respondents of this research.

The result of survey to 61 respondents that is the political party cadres in Denpasar aims to answer the persistence of self-determination principle which implies the political party cadres involved in the survey. From 61 respondents, in questionnaire number 25, that is the opened question of the political party cadres perception about the importance/need of a clinic od political parties, fifteen respondents said it is very needed, sixteen respondents said it is needed and other thirty respondents stated it is not needed or they don't have idea. This survey answers the worries of researchers from three universities in Denpasar on the implementation of FGD initiated with Association of Political Sciences Indonesia/AIPI branch Bali on 20 April 2017. Therefore, we run another measurement model to get an insight of the data.




Figure 2: Measurement model.

The above model shows that the financial variables do not have direct influence on the importance of political parties clinic, but must be through democracy variable (democracy variable is the mediator variable between the financial variables to the political party clinic). While SEM analysis for the combined score of regulation (var A) to the combined score of democracy (var B) shows that count alpha = 0.065 with value of alpha negative coefficients, value of -0.19 indicate a significant rejection. It shows that variable B (democracy) becomes a mediator variable.

As a variable mediator, variable B (democracy) has a negative coefficient with variable A (regulation). This shows that the high score of variable A reduces the score of variable B. This can be understood that given the relation of variable A to the level of clinical needs of the party is unidirectional. The opposite relationship occurs in variable C (financial governance and financial reporting) that has a positive coefficient to variable B (democracy), it shows that the higher the score of variable C, the higher the weight of variable B (democracy).

The above measurement model explains the relationship between variables as follows:

- Variable A (**regulation** of institutions and information to the public) has a significant and tighter relationship to the level of clinical needs of political parties
- Variable B (**democracy**) has a significant direct relationship to the level of party clinical needs, but not in the same direction. This means that the higher the variable B score, the more reduced the level of clinical needs of the party
- Variable C (governance **finance** and party financial reporting) does not have a direct relationship to the level of clinical needs of political parties, but must be through variable B (democracy) as a mediator variable, these two variables have direct relationship.
- Variable D (the need of **political parties clinic**), can be summarized as not yet necessary. Go

back to raw data of survey, 31 respondents wrote that political parties clinic is necessary while 30 cadres as respondents wrote either unnecessary or do not know.

4 CONCLUSIONS

In summary, there are communication problems that are less good, so in preparing clinic for political parties must include all political parties elites as without those elites, political party clinic will not have much impact for non-elitist cadres in each political parties. More effective communication is needed in order to involve more party members/cadres in the decision-making process, so that party clinics can be perceived as beneficial to all members of Political Parties. Perhaps the variable of democracy in the questionnaire becomes the most difficult questions posed for the cadres of Political Parties who become the respondents of this research. Their back ground, as Hadiz (2010: 29) explained on Gede Winasa as a former bupati/governor of Jemberana was rather as a new local strongman so as Suryawan (2013) see it as an interconnection within elites. Similar to Schiller (2009: 157) assertion on local majorities of cadres (in this case Baladika Bali, Laskar Bali and Pemuda Bali Bersatu so as Buldog and other small mass organizations in Bali) as Nugraha et al, also point out the strength of those political cadres principle of wanting to win, only winning the power. They do whatever they can do to impress the community but most of people get scared (Purnama, Sunu and Sanjaya, 2014, Sukma, 2013 and Suryawan, 2013) if they are winning.

The team of research sees the reluctant of political cadres to increase their quality as their own symptom of those political parties cadres involved in the survey. They are more likely to be opportunists. Therefore, it is time for three universities in Denpasar to work together and form a center for political parties and local government research as suggested by Aminudin (2017) from CIPR (Consortium of Indonesian Political Research). Also Gadjah Mada University had the idea of running the clinic of political parties but they found similar problem like in Bali. This evidence based research is enough to strengthen the idea of setting up a center for the study of political parties and local governments in Denpasar.

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