

# Impact of Security Measures on Performance Aspects in SysML Models

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**Abstract:** Because embedded systems are now frequently connected, security must be taken into consideration during system modeling. However adding security features can degrade performance. In this paper, the trade-off between security and performance is tackled with a new model-based method that can automatically assess the impact of security measures on performance. The contribution is illustrated with an industrial motor control taken from the H2020 AQUAS project.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Ensuring the safety of embedded systems implies to also take into account security threats (Chai et al., 2019) (Jiang et al., 2013). However security measures require extra processing time which might degrade system performance (Chai et al., 2019)(Li, 2018)(Kocher et al., 2004)(Apvrille and Li, 2019).

(Davis, 2014) defines the time constraints as "end-to-end deadlines on the elapsed time between a stimuli and the corresponding response". (Li, 2018) added to that the percentage of usage of system's components to characterize system performance.

Studying security and performance in an isolated manner is not as efficient as considering the dependency between them (Gruber et al., 2018). Also, as stated by (Viehl et al., 2006), estimating performance and evaluating an architectures at an early design stage is considered as "very valuable approach in the area of SoC design".

Our contribution proposes to tackle the interdependency and trade-offs between performance and security requirements of embedded systems at an early design stage. Our new performance analysis approach is based on simulation traces and SysML model analysis. It is expected to allow engineers to adjust better the design in early stages of the product life cycle, leading to a balanced solution with a decrease in the development time and efforts and an increase in product quality (Friedenthal et al., 2014). The novelty of the presented performance analysis method is its ability to provide answers to questions such as (i) which security HW/SW might delay a critical event, (ii) how to map security algorithms (e.g. HW/SW

components) and which more general hardware platform should be used, including buses able not to delay critical messages, including secured messages.

These questions form a subset of larger set of questions faced by a designer during a system-level design (Thiele et al., 2007). Answers to these questions will help designers estimate the relation between added security and performance early in the design.

The next section studies related work. Then, section 3 presents the SysML-Sec modeling and verification approach upon which our new contribution is based. Our performance analysis approach is explained in section 4, and illustrated in section 5 with a motor drive system. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.

## 2 RELATED WORK

Although the trade off between security and performance in embedded systems has been highlighted since years (Kocher et al., 2004), it wasn't until recently that the impact of added security on system performance started to be studied in the design stage.

Fujdiak et al (Fujdiak et al., 2018) proposes experimental measurements that demonstrate a linear relation between security levels and performance.

(Li et al., 2017) relies on a modeling and verification tool named TTool (Apvrille, 2013) (section 3) to study the security-performance dependency in a disaster relief drone model. In their work, Li et al, compared the total execution cycles of secure and non secure designs to show the performance impacts of security in concrete systems. Yet, designers have

no way to figure out which HW/SW elements really caused extra delays.

To enhance this security-performance trade-off study, the *latency* concept was added to TTool (Li, 2018). TTool can thus now measure the min, max and average latency between (safety critical) events. Yet, the explanation of why the latency has increased when updating a model still relies on manual analysis of — sometimes very long — simulation traces.

Another approach to study the trade-off between security and performance is based on the interaction between two different tools as presented in (Fujdiak et al., 2019). In this interaction, TTool was used to help decide which security level shall be selected with regards to the desired performance by comparing the final system response time of a model for different security levels.

Time analysis can be performed using multiple approaches. These approaches can be classified into different categories. Simulation and formal approaches are the most used ones in the domain of performance estimation of embedded systems (Thiele et al., 2007) (Viehl et al., 2006). While simulation tools and industrial frameworks e.g. Koski (Kangas et al., 2006) can only consider a limited set of execution traces and corner cases are usually unknown (Thiele et al., 2007), formal approaches like timed automata are usually limited on scope to the model under analysis where sharing of resources leading to complex interactions among components is difficult to take into consideration.

To overcome the limitations encountered when using either methods, (Thiele et al., 2007) and (Viehl et al., 2006) combined simulation and formal approaches to analyze system performance. However in these approaches, verifying the security of a model and the impact of the added security method on the functional and architecture aspects is not supported.

The model-based environment TimeSquare (DeAntoni and Mallet, 2012), supporting the Clock Constraint Specification Language (CCSL), provides facilities for performance analysis, in particular for the analysis of execution traces. Yet, it lacks security verification and architecture exploration techniques.

Based on this overview, we will take advantage of the already developed security-performance trade-off analysis within TTool and more precisely its modeling profile named SysML-Sec to study the effect of security features (added computations, added communications and increased message sizes) onto system performance.

### 3 SysML-Sec

#### 3.1 Method

Sysml-Sec is one of the modeling profiles supported by the free and open-source toolkit named TTool (Apvrille, 2013). Sysml-Sec (Apvrille and Roudier, 2013) extends SysML for the design of safe and secure embedded systems while taking performance aspects into account. SysML-Sec methodology allows system designers to iterate over safety and security features and continuously check if the system requirements still hold. This verification can be done along the three stages of the SysML-Sec method (see Figure 1): analysis, HW/SW Partitioning and Software Design (Apvrille and Li, 2019).

After the analysis stage where requirements attacks and faults are captured, system design includes system-level HW/SW partitioning and software design. First, in the HW/SW partitioning stage, the architecture and high-level functional behavior are modeled at a high-level of abstraction and then linked in the mapping stage, as defined in the Y-Chart approach (Kienhuis et al., 2001). Second, the design of software components is performed (Li, 2018).

Verification can be performed with a press-button approach from most diagrams to determine if the defined requirements are satisfied. TTool can perform verifications using formal techniques (e.g., model-checking) and simulations. Safety verification relies on the TTool model checker. Security verification relies on an external toolkit called ProVerif (Blanchet et al., 2018). Performance verification relies on a System-C like simulator of TTool.




Figure 1: SysML-Sec modeling profile used in TTool.

#### 3.2 HW/SW Partitioning

The paper now focuses on HW/SW partitioning. A HW/SW partitioning  $P$  is formally defined as the composition of a Functional Model  $FM$ , an Architec-

ture Model  $AM$  and a Mapping Model  $MM$  (Li, 2018):

$$P = (FM, AM, MM) \quad (1)$$

### 3.2.1 Application/Functional Modeling

A Functional Model  $FM$  is captured with SysML block diagrams.  $FM$  has a set of Tasks  $T$  and of communications  $Comm$  between tasks (Li, 2018):

$$FM = (T, Comm) \quad (2)$$

Each task  $t \in T$  has a set of attributes  $Attr$  and a behavior  $\mathcal{O}$  described with an activity diagram built upon a set of operators:

$$t = (Attr, \mathcal{O}) \quad (3)$$

Operators (equation 4) can be divided into 3 operator categories. Control operators  $CtrlOp$  handle the execution flow of a task e.g. loops and tests. Communication operators  $CommOp$  refer to Channels, Events or Requests: channels model data exchange, events are used for synchronization and requests model task spawning. Last, Complexity operators  $CompOp$  capture computation complexity e.g. in terms of int operations ( $ExecI$ ). An operator  $\theta \in \mathcal{O}$  is defined as follows:

$$\theta \in \{StartState, StopState, ForLoop, Choice, Sequence, SelectEvt, SendEvent, ReadChannel, WriteChannel, SendRequest, ReadRequestArg, WaitEvent, ExecI, ExecC, Delay, Random\} \quad (4)$$

The next operator(s) for each  $\theta$  are known as a set of  $sub_{\theta}$ . CtrlOp operators may have several next operators depending on the guard conditions. The connection between  $\theta$  and its next operators in  $sub_{\theta}$  will be denoted as  $ControlFlow_{(\theta \rightarrow sub_{\theta})}$ .

### 3.2.2 Architecture Modeling

An Architecture Model  $AM$  is built upon a set of hardware nodes and links  $Links$  between nodes described with a UML Deployment Diagram. Hardware nodes are split into of three sets: execution ( $ExecNode$ ), communication ( $CommNode$ ) and storage nodes ( $StNode$ ). An Architecture Model is defined as follows:

$$AM = (ExecNode, CommNode, StNode, Links) \quad (5)$$

### 3.2.3 Mapping Modeling

A mapping model specifies where tasks and there communications are allocated to hardware components using UML deployment diagrams. Tasks mapped to processors are software implemented

while tasks mapped to Hardware Accelerators are hardware implemented. A task  $t$  mapped in a partitioning  $p$  is denoted as  $t_p$ .

## 4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Simulation of mapping models helps understanding system performance especially after security measures have been added. Yet, understanding the precise cause of extra latencies when adding extra mechanisms requires to improve the ways simulation traces can be investigated. To so do, we introduce a new way (shown in Figure 2) to compare parts of simulation traces (called "simulation trace analysis" or STA) related to an extra mechanism.

1. A simulation trace is computed using TTool's simulator
2. Among the operators  $\mathcal{O}$  of all tasks in  $T$ , the designer selects two of them between which the latency will be analyzed.
3. The mapping model is transformed into a directed graph so as to analyze the dependencies inside of the simulation trace
4. The Simulation trace, the two operators, and the directed graph are injected into our *simulation trace analyzer* (detailed below).

Of course, all other verification techniques (e.g. verifying security properties) are still available and used for their respective purposes.

### 4.1 Latency Graph Generation

Latency graphs are directed graphs. A mapping model is transformed into a latency graph  $G$  consisting of a set of vertices's  $v$  and a set of directed edges  $\epsilon$ .

$$G = (v, \epsilon) \quad (6)$$

A vertex in the set  $v$  represents either a task, or a task operator in the functional model, or a hardware node in the architecture model

$$v \subseteq N_{AM} \cup N_{FM} \quad (7)$$

where  $N_{AM} \in \{CommNode, StoreNode, ExecNode\}$  and  $N_{FM} \in \{T, \theta\}$  An edge in the set  $\epsilon$  represents an element of an activity diagram i.e.

$$\epsilon \subseteq Links \cup Comm \cup ControlFlow_{(\theta \rightarrow sub_{\theta})} \quad (8)$$

Algorithm 1 (simplified version: loops and sequences are not shown) builds the graph according to operators listed in equation 4.




Figure 2: Detailed Latency Analysis Method added to SysML-sec.

## 4.2 Detailed Latency Analysis Method

### 4.2.1 Simulation Transaction

TTool's simulator for mapped models is transaction-based (Knorreck, 2011), and takes into account both HW and SW elements. For short, a simulation transaction contains the following attributes:

- **device, task and operator:** *device* executed an *operator* of *task*
- **startTime** and **endTime** (in clock cycles)
- **length:** number of clock cycles needed to execute the transaction

### 4.2.2 Simulation Trace

The simulation of a mapped model  $p$  for a time interval  $[t_1, t_2]$  outputs a simulation trace  $s_p^{t_1, t_2}$  built upon  $n$  simulation transactions  $st_x$ :

$$s_p^{t_1, t_2} = \{st_1, \dots, st_n\} \quad (9)$$

### 4.2.3 Latency between Operators

Let  $\theta_A$  and  $\theta_B$  be the two operators between which the latency is studied in  $s_p$ . All transactions  $st \in s_p^{t_1, t_2}$  where  $st.operator = \theta_A$  are added to  $Occ_{\theta_A}$  (ordered by start time). Same for  $Occ_{\theta_B}$ . Equation 10 defines  $Occ_{\theta_A}$ .

$$Occ_{\theta_A} = \{st_{0_A}, st_{1_A}, \dots, st_{n_A}\} \quad (10)$$

The time delay between the  $i^{th}$  transaction in  $Occ_{\theta_A}$  and  $Occ_{\theta_B}$  referred to as latency  $\lambda_i$  can be calculated as:

$$\lambda_i = endTime_{(st_{i_B} \in Occ_{\theta_B})} - startTime_{(st_{i_A} \in Occ_{\theta_A})} \quad (11)$$

To compute  $\lambda_i$ ,  $Occ_{\theta_A}$  and  $Occ_{\theta_B}$  should each contain a transaction at the  $i^{th}$  position related to  $\theta_A$  and  $\theta_B$  respectively. In case this condition is not satisfied, or in case the designer is interested in the max and min latencies, the algorithm for calculating min and max latencies (Li, 2018) is applied on  $Occ_{\theta_A}$  and  $Occ_{\theta_B}$ . TTool can now display  $\lambda_i$  as well as  $\lambda_{min}$  and  $\lambda_{max}$  representing the minimum and maximum latency values between  $Occ_{\theta_A}$  and  $Occ_{\theta_B}$ .

### 4.2.4 Latency Analysis

Algorithm 2 can compute the reason for the time delay between the  $i^{th}$  occurrence of the selected operators. It first extracts only all relevant transactions i.e. the ones related to the studied latency. To do so, the algorithm searches the trace  $s_p$  for transactions that occurred between the  $startTime_{st_{i_A}}$  and  $endTime_{st_{i_B}}$  denoted as  $s'_p$ . It takes as input  $\theta_A$ ,  $\theta_B$ ,  $startTime_{st_{i_A}}$ ,  $endTime_{st_{i_B}}$ ,  $s_p$ , and the generated latency graph  $G$ . When the considered time delay is  $\lambda_{min}$  or  $\lambda_{max}$ , the same algorithm (algorithm 2) is used however  $startTime_{st_{i_A}}$  and  $endTime_{st_{i_B}}$  are replaced by either  $startTime_{st_{min_A}}$  and  $endTime_{st_{min_B}}$  or  $startTime_{st_{max_A}}$  and  $endTime_{st_{max_B}}$  respectively. However not all transactions in  $s'_p$  are directly related to the delay between  $startTime_{st_{i_A}}$  and  $endTime_{st_{i_B}}$ . In order to extract which transactions are involved in this delay, we rely on graph  $g$ : we first build all possible paths  $Pa$  from  $\theta_A$  to  $\theta_B$ . For each transaction in  $st \in s'_p$ , if  $st$  belongs to  $Pa$  then we consider that  $st$  is mandatory i.e. it contributes directly to the delay  $\lambda_i$ , thus it is added to an array named *onPathTransactions*. In case there is no path between *node* $_{\theta_A}$  and *node* $_{\theta_B}$ , then a transaction is considered

Algorithm 1: Latency Graph Generation.

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```

Data: Mapping Diagram
Result: Latency Graph
1 foreach node in AM | node
  ∈ {CommNode, StoreNode} do
2   addVertex(node);
3   foreach Comm | ∃ mapping (node, Comm)
     do
4     addVertex(Comm);
5     addEdge(node, Comm);
6   end
7 end
8 foreach node in AM | node ∈ ExecNode do
9   addVertex(node);
10  foreach task | ∃ mapping (node, task) do
11    addVertex(task);
12    addEdge(node, task);
13    while ∃ operator  $\theta$  |  $\theta \in \mathcal{O}_{task}$  do
14      previousOp.add({ $\theta$ , sub $\theta$ });
15      if  $\theta$  instanceof StartState then
16        addVertex( $\theta$ );
17        addEdge(task,  $\theta$ );
18      else if  $\theta$  instanceof StopState then
19        addVertex( $\theta$ );
20        foreach  $\theta_i$  |  $\theta_i \in$  previousOp
           do
21          if  $\theta \in$  sub $\theta_i$  then
22            addEdge( $\theta_i$ ,  $\theta$ );
23            if  $\theta_i \in$  sub $\theta_j$  | sub $\theta_j \in$ 
              previousOp and  $\theta_j$ 
              instanceof ForLoop
              or Sequence then
24              addEdge( $\theta$ ,  $\theta_j$ );
25            end
26            ...
27          end
28        else
29          addVertex( $\theta$ );
30          foreach  $\theta_i$  |  $\theta_i \in$  previousOp
             do
31            if  $\theta \in$  sub $\theta_i$  then
32              addEdge( $\theta_i$ ,  $\theta$ );
33            end
34          end
35        end
36      end
37 end
38 foreach link in Links do
39   addEdge(linkstart, linkend)
40 end
41 foreach taskComm in Comm do
42   addEdge(taskCommsend, taskCommrec)
43 end

```

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as mandatory if it corresponds to a node  $node_{\theta}$  that has path from  $node_{\theta_A}$  or a path to  $node_{\theta_B}$ .

In addition to the traces added to *onPathTransactions*,  $s'_p$  might contain transactions that are not on the path between  $node_{\theta_A}$  and  $node_{\theta_B}$  but which may be executed on the same hardware as either  $\theta_A$  or  $\theta_B$ . These transactions, saved in *hardwareDelayTran* array, might contribute to  $\lambda_i$  because of the scheduling policies: they might delay transactions related to *onPathTransactions* thus contributing to an increase in  $\lambda_i$ .

TTool can display the result of algorithm 2 with a table. In this table, each row corresponds to one hardware node in the system and each column represents one time slot in the simulation. Transactions are placed according to when and where they were executed. The transactions that belong to *onPathTransactions* are displayed in green and the ones belonging to *hardwareDelayTran* are displayed in red, thus giving an immediate view of the simulation transactions and their related SysML elements involved in an extra delay. In the scope of this paper, the transactions in *hardwareDelayTran* are colored red regardless if their scheduling increased the delay between  $startTime_{st_A}$  and  $endTime_{st_B}$  or not. We intend to address this limitation (future work). Also, our algorithm does not (yet) handle extra delays due to contentions on communication and storage nodes.

## 5 CASE STUDY

A motor drive system —defined in the scope of the H2020 AQUAS project (AQU, 2013)— shows our performance analysis contribution from SysML models. The system consists of 3 main components: a motor, a motor controller and a client application. The motor controller receives speed and direction values from the client application and accordingly generates the right PWM (Pulse Width Modulation) signals and sends them to the motor. In addition, the motor controller regularly monitors the position data from the motor to accordingly adjust PWM signals as needed. Two requirements are considered in the paper:

1. A maximum delay between a user setting speed and direction values in the client application and time at which the motor controller takes these new values into consideration (safety requirement)
2. The speed and direction values sent from the client application to the controller should remain confidential (security requirement)

Algorithm 2: Simulation trace analysis.

```

Data:  $\theta_A, \theta_B, startTime_{st_A}, endTime_{st_B}, s_p, g$ 
Result: Detailed time analysis between  $\theta_A, \theta_B$ 
1 foreach SimulationTransaction  $st$  in  $s_p$  do
2   if  $st.startTime \geq startTime_{st_A}$ 
3   and  $st.endTime \leq endTime_{st_B}$  then
4      $s'_p.add(st)$ 
5     if  $\exists path(node_{\theta_A} \rightarrow node_{\theta_B})$  in  $g$ 
6     then
7       if  $node_{\theta_{st}} \in path$  then
8          $onPathTransactions.add(st)$ 
9         break;
10      else if  $st.deviceName == hardware_{\theta_A || \theta_B}$  then
11         $hardwareDelayTran.add(st);$ 
12      end
13    else
14      if  $\exists path(node_{\theta_A} \rightarrow node_{\theta_{st}}) || \exists path(node_{\theta_{st}} \rightarrow node_{\theta_B})$  then
15         $onPathTransactions.add(st)$ 
16      else if  $st.deviceName == hardware_{\theta_A || \theta_B}$  then
17         $hardwareDelayTran.add(st);$ 
18    end
19  end
20 end

```

### 5.1 HW/SW Partitioning Models

The functional model consists of 3 main tasks (Figure 3): *Client\_App*, *Motor\_Control\_App*, and *Motor*. The *Client\_App* gets speed and direction from a user and sends them to the *Main\_Loop* in *Motor\_Control\_App* through the *Server\_Control\_App*. In each periodic iteration of *Main\_Loop*, the speed and direction of the motor are deduced by reading the position data and current value sent from the *Motor* via *Motor\_Control\_Power*. Then the deduced values are compared with the required values of both the speed and direction. In case an adjustment is required, the *Main\_Loop* sends updated PWM signals to the *Motor\_Control\_Power*. *Motor\_Control\_Power* transforms these signals into supply voltages and issues these signals to the motor.

Due to limited space, Figure 4 shows only *Client\_App* and *Server\_Control\_App* applications and details the activity diagrams of only one task of each: *Update\_MotorData* and *ReceiveMotorSD\_Control*, shown on the left and right in Figure 4 where start and stop operators are colored black, request operators are in brown, event operators are in purple and action op-




Figure 3: Case Study Overview.

erators are in green. The functional tasks in Figure 4 are mapped on the architecture shown in Figure 5, with two CPUs (blue) and two memories (green) connected by buses (brown) and bridges (orange).

### 5.2 System Verification

A simulation trace showing the latency between *sending a new input* in the *Client\_App* (our operator "A" i.e.  $\theta_A$ ) and *receiving this input* in *Main\_Loop* (operator "B" i.e.  $\theta_B$ ) is computed. The Latency Analysis tool of TTool takes as input this trace, the two operators ( $\theta_A, \theta_B$ ), and the model so as to generate the latency graph. The latency graph of *Receive-MotorSD\_Control* is given in Figure 6. The dotted edges in Figure 6 are logical dependency edges from/towards vertexes that are not shown in the graph. The latency detailed analysis shows that the time between  $\theta_A$  and  $\theta_B$  is 273 cycles. Figure 7 displays the detailed latency of the simulation trace. As mentioned earlier, the green colored cells in Figure 7 are the transactions corresponding to nodes ( $node_{\theta}$ ) that are on the path from to  $\theta_B$ , while those colored red are transactions not on the path but executed on the same hardware as  $\theta_A$  or  $\theta_B$  and might add delay due to scheduling.

To prove that the confidentiality requirement between *Client\_App* and *Server\_Control\_App* is satisfied, TTool relies on ProVerif. In a first verification run the proof fails (as indicated by the crossed red lock in Figure 4). To address confidentiality, encryption/decryption operators are added as described in (Li, 2018). We chose the AES algorithm and set the computational complexity to 3000 as indicated in (Fujdiak et al., 2019). The verification now outputs a green lock in Figure 4: confidentiality is satisfied.

The latency detailed analysis for the secure model tells us that the time between  $\theta_A$  and  $\theta_B$  is now 6301 cycles. Figure 8 shows that the transactions that were executed during this delay start differing from the non secure model at cycle 11 where the encryption procedure starts. Studying the two latency detailed analysis figures allows us to conclude that the increase in time between the secure and non secure model is due to the added encryption/decryption. Moreover, the latency detailed analysis helps us to understand when the encryption/decryption started/ended and how did




Figure 4: Functional View.




Figure 5: Mapping View.




Figure 6: Excerpt of the Latency Graph.

it effect the scheduling of tasks.

In case the latency violated safety or performance requirements, the system designer can either add hardware accelerators for encryption/decryption, or more powerful processing units, or use other security algorithms, or try a different mapping, or finally adjust the scheduling policy of a CPU.

## 6 CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES

The semi-automated performance analysis technique introduced in this paper allows system designers to study the trade-off between security and performance at high level of abstraction. To do so, simulation traces are analyzed based on a generated directed graph that corresponds to the model under investigation.

This work was integrated in SysML-Sec and TTool. A use case from the AQUAS H2020 project was used to highlight the advantages of knowing the transactions causing delays between two operators.

The presented approach could probably be extended to also cover safety aspects in a combined safety/security/performance holistic co-analysis. This extension will be the objective of future works

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Device Name	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
CPU Application_1		F...	F...	F...	F...	F...	F...	F...	F...	FunctionalView	send MotorData	write channel: sendCommandData(1) 222
CPU0_1									F...	F...	F...	
Bus1_0										FunctionalView	send MotorData	write channel: sendCommandData(1) 222

Figure 7: Detailed Latency between  $\theta_A$  and  $\theta_B$ .

Device Name	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
CPU Application_1		F...	F...		F...	F...	F...		F...		FunctionalView	send MotorData	encrypt 224
CPU0_1									F...	F...	F...		

Figure 8: Detailed Latency between  $\theta_A$  and  $\theta_B$  in Secure Model.

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