4. Disseminating false or misleading information.
There are several significant challenges in identi-
fying such events, transactions, and actions. Firstly,
few examples of manipulation are cited in the lit-
erature, or identified and published in practice by
surveillance authorities. There is thus no comprehen-
sive labelled set of manipulation examples that can
be used to develop detection methods. Secondly, it
may be challenging to determine if a given market-
moving event or transaction results from a manipu-
lation attempt or a result of legitimate factors. For
example, a generation volume may be removed from
the market to manipulate price, or alternatively due
to environmental factors and regulations that restrict
generation from the plant for certain hours at short
notice. Thirdly, it may be hard to identify such
events/transactions because they may be combined
with other transactions.
Due to such challenges, it is hard for any one
method to identify explicitly “exact” actions or be-
haviour as manipulation. Instead, the approach un-
dertaken by surveillance authorities is often to collect
enough circumstantial and/or indicative evidence to
suggest manipulation has occurred. Such evidence
can include detecting unusual structures, patterns or
changes in individual bids and the bid and offer curves
in summation. Typically, a surveillance authority will
utilize a combination of automatic rule-based detec-
tion methods and manual examination of bids and
market results to identify potential incidences of ma-
nipulation. Those incidents with sufficient evidence
to warrant; further, manual investigation are priori-
tized, and those with the highest priority are selected
for further analysis (private communication).
The assumption motivating the approach of this
paper is that if supply–side manipulation is success-
ful, it will result in an unusual change in the sup-
ply curve. Such manipulations are volume-based at-
tempts (such as removing or limiting available vol-
umes bid into the market) or price-based (such as in-
creasing bid prices in areas of the curve where a sup-
plier may have market power), or combinations of
these. More complex examples include utilizing com-
plicated block and hourly bid structures to force block
bid acceptance or ensure the selection of high-priced
bids to raise MCP. Such methods may be particularly
relevant in periods of high demand (so-called “tight”
markets), where small changes in supply can have a
substantial impact on the price (Directive, 2011).
4 METHODOLOGY
4.1 Data Preparation
One of our datasets consists of Nord Pool’s system-
level (whole market) bid curves, ranging from
01/06/2019 to 31/12/2019. The curve data is pub-
licly available on Nord Pool’s website. The dataset of
system-level price curves also contains the volume of
hourly accepted block bids – both demand and sup-
ply. Adding these accepted block volumes to the ad-
justed hourly bid and sell curves enables us to recreate
each hour’s system-level supply and demand curves
over the data horizon. We have 24 hourly bid buy
curves and 24 sell curves for the system price for each
day. Our study considers only sell curves; however,
the methodology is also directly applicable to demand
curves.
The other dataset we used is confidential data pro-
vided by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy
Directorate (NVE), the national regulatory authority
for the electricity market in Norway. The dataset con-
sists of price area curves of the area ‘NO2’ in Norway
for the same period as above. Norway has five price
areas (NO1, NO2, NO3, NO4, NO5) to handle trans-
mission constraints. Prices differ in the bidding areas
when the constraints are binding, with higher prices in
deficit areas and lower in surplus areas (Hjalmarsson,
2000). Therefore, the area-price curves are different
from system-level price curves, but the curve funda-
mentals are the same.
4.2 Curve Processing
In the electricity markets, bids of unregulated renew-
able generation (sometimes called intermittent gen-
eration) are generally of very low prices in order to
ensure bid acceptance. The volumes of renewable
bids – wind, solar and unregulated hydro – are de-
termined mainly by extraneous environmental factors
such as cloud cover, temperature, precipitation, and
wind speeds. These factors add additional noise to the
curve structure that does not reflect potential manip-
ulation attempts and should be removed before mod-
elling.
While a surveillance authority ideally would have
information of the exact level of such generation ca-
pacities and bids available to precisely remove them,
this is not generally the case in many markets where
bids are not linked to specific assets but portfolios or
market actors. However, it is standard practice to bid
such volumes at the lowest price to ensure bid ac-
ceptance, particularly in markets such as Nord Pool,
where the chance of such bids being price setter is ex-
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