Risk-driven Model-based Architecture Design
for Secure Information Flows in Manufacturing Infrastructures
Loris Dal Lago
, Fabio Federici
, Davide Martintoni
and Valerio Senni
Applied Research and Technology, Collins Aerospace, Piazza dell’Indipendenza 23, 00185 Rome, Italy
Keywords: Risk Assessment, Information-flow Security, Model-based Design, Industrial Manufacturing Security.
Abstract: Modern manufacturing infrastructures leverage internet and intranet connectivity to guarantee the remote
execution of services at the shopfloor level, continued operations and remote reconfigurability. Nonetheless,
equipment used in industrial plants is not always prepared to withstand the security challenges introduced by
increased connectivity demands, thus exposing the overall system to security threats. We propose a model-
based approach to combine secure design of digital infrastructures for manufacturing with a rigorous security
risk assessment, enabling trusted connectivity for equipment, with a robust analysis method for the evaluation
of their security properties. To that aim, information flow paths are captured between functions and equipment,
assets and threats are identified, mitigations and new security requirements are defined. Mitigations are then
propagated to the level of implementation, where we rely on hardware-enforced isolation to provide trusted
computation and data protection. In this paper we demonstrate our methodological approach using an
extension of the SysML language for threat modelling and by relying on ARM TrustZone for hardware
isolation. Our approach is sufficiently general to be reused for other domains and alternative technologies.
In the age of IoT and connected infrastructures, the
security of systems is of paramount importance for
the availability of services and the reputation of
companies providing those services. The domain of
digital manufacturing has started to focus, more and
more, on remote collaboration solutions, rising the
challenge of new connectivity demands and entailing
strong obligations to secure data produced and stored
by manufacturing equipment. At the level of shop
floors, information is essential to optimize operations,
guarantee products quality, support innovation and
reduce costs related to certification (Int. Data Spaces
Assn., 2021). Moreover, manufacturing solutions for
safety-critical products (e.g., for automotive or
aerospace application domains) require a high level
of security assurance, to establish trust in the supply
chain and ensure the safety of the end systems. In this
domain, it is common to use third-party’s equipment,
whose detailed functions and security configurations
may be only partially available. It is well known, on
the other hand, that the endpoints of a network
infrastructure are frequently the weakest nodes, due
to their limited computational capabilities and
inevitable presence of legacy, thus becoming easy
vectors for broader attacks (Dragos, 2021).
Motivated by these considerations, we propose a
systematic approach that (1) combines the design of
digital manufacturing infrastructures with their
security risk assessment, by identifying current
threats and evaluating the level of risk associated with
them, (2) supports the identification of mitigations to
the found security threats, (3) helps tracing the
security elements to the architectural components
they relate to and (4) guides the implementation of
security measures, with focus on the protection of
remotely accessible endpoints.
As a first step, our approach leverages model-
based representations of architectures to analyze
information flows and security policies, support the
identification of weaknesses, quantify their induced
Dal Lago, L., Federici, F., Martintoni, D. and Senni, V.
Risk-driven Model-based Architecture Design for Secure Information Flows in Manufacturing Infrastructures.
DOI: 10.5220/0011144700003283
In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT 2022), pages 499-506
ISBN: 978-989-758-590-6; ISSN: 2184-7711
2022 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
risks, and propose mitigations for the unacceptable
ones. Mitigations induce new security requirements
and their allocation to elements of the architecture.
The fulfillment of the new security requirements
is then supported by providing guidance and best
practices for the addition of Architectural Patterns
(i.e. architectural solutions for the enforcement of
security properties) and the use of Security Building
Blocks (i.e. SW/HW implementation solutions that
can be used to realize specific security functions). In
the case of reference we will introduce a gateway as
an Architectural Pattern to manage the separation of
information flows of legacy endpoint equipments. We
will further use SW routines on top of hardware-
enforced isolation primitives as the Security Building
Blocks, allowing to protect edge components and
their data during the execution of sensitive processes.
To facilitate adoption and minimize disruption of
existing processes, our approach is developed on top
of well-recognized modeling tools/languages and
established risk analysis practices. We present the
evaluation of the approach on a remote maintenance
case study, where components of different parties and
with different levels of trust access share functions
within the boundaries of the same architecture.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2
describes our security risk assessment methodology.
Section 3 provides details on the use of SysML
models for risk assessments. Section 4 showcases the
application of our method to a case study inspired by
the manufacturing domain, with details on how the
required mitigations are implemented. Finally, we
discuss related work and future directions.
The literature offers several approaches to
cybersecurity risk assessment (Rocchetto, Ferrari, &
Senni, 2019) and their terminology vary from one
approach to the other, based on the domain and
community. Our terminology and workflow are
inspired by the cybersecurity risk assessment
guidelines of DO-326A/DO-356A aerospace
standards, whose guiding principles are sufficiently
general to be applied to domains other than aerospace.
With these premises, we start our discussion by
defining the key terms used in the rest of the paper:
Asset: a valuable logical or physical resource that
requires protection from a security perspective.
Security Policy: the rules to determine the allowed
security interactions for a system, including the
identification of trusted flows of information from
assets to internal and external entities.
Attack Vector: an exploitable entry point or interface
on the system architecture for external malicious
actors to perform an attack.
Threat Condition: an unwanted condition (or state) of
an Asset, caused by the activity of external
malicious actors, with consequences to the security
the overall system.
Threat Model: a characterization of a set of Threat
Conditions in terms of target Assets, evaluated
against envisioned activities of external malicious
actors and their accessibility to Attack Vectors.
Threat Scenario: a description of a potential
unauthorized interaction by an external malicious
actor, identifying the Attack Vector and the path in
the architecture leading to a Threat Condition.
Risk: a quantitative account of the Threat Conditions
associated to a specific Asset, in terms of severity
and exposure to the identified Threat Scenarios.
Risk Evaluation: the analysis of all Threat Conditions
affecting an Asset to quantify the associated Risk.
Risk Mitigation: the quantitative reduction of a Risk
by modification of an architecture to reduce the
impact, severity or occurrence of Threat Scenarios.
Security Measure: The response to a Risk Evaluation,
identified by activities of Risk Mitigation.
The methodology and high-level workflow to the
security risk assessment of digital manufacturing
architectures is provided in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Methodology for risk assessment.
On the left of the picture, we represent the desired
improvement of the Current (potentially unsecure)
Architecture to a final Secured Architecture, achieved
through the integration of appropriate Security
Measures. The initial version of the Current
Architecture is a preliminary description of the
system, representing either a legacy infrastructure, a
new design, or a mix between the two. Improvement
of this architecture may, in some cases, require a few
iterations, until all appropriate mitigations are in
place. In this paper the Current Architecture is
SECRYPT 2022 - 19th International Conference on Security and Cryptography
assumed to be available, and we defer to future work
the challenges associated to creating one.
On the right of the picture, we represent the
process through which the Security Measures are
derived, based on the Security Requirements yielded
by the workflow. The key inputs to this process are
Assets, Security Policies, and the Threat Model.
Those inputs, in conjunction with the Current
Architecture, are used to identify the Threat
Scenarios, which are described in terms of elements
of the Current Architecture. Then, Threat Scenarios
are analysed to provide a Risk Evaluation. This step
is performed by aggregating Threat Scenarios by
their cumulative impact on Assets and considering
their realization complexity. This leads to the
systematic identification of potential weaknesses in
the Current Architecture and a characterization of
information flows, which may expose the overall
system to the occurrence of Threat Conditions. Thus,
the final step consists in the selection of the above-
threshold (unacceptable) risks and identification of
appropriate Risk Mitigations to address those risks.
The introduction of Risk Mitigations facilitates
the generation of new Security Requirements,
yielding the refinement of the Current Architecture to
the Secured Architecture. Driven by the experience
of the architect, security requirements may lead to the
reorganization of the information flows, the
introduction of additional (security) functions and the
encapsulation of existing ones in protected context.
Architectural Patterns and Security Building Blocks
are considered at this stage, as defined in the
introduction, to support the refinement process.
At this point, the Secured Architecture will drive
the implementation. Being the implementation more
concrete, it may hide additional weaknesses and
influence security at the level of multiple Risks.
Therefore, to prove the efficacy of mitigations after
the implementation, the identified Security Measures
and their integration are validated. In case this
validation phase finds weaknesses at this level,
further iterations and analyses are induced with
feedback to the Current Architecture, and additional
security improvements are provided by the workflow.
To realize the Security Risk Assessment (SecRA)
workflow presented in Section 2, we present a model-
based approach. We base this work on the SysML
modelling language, extended with a specific profile
for supporting the workflow and analysis. This profile
supports the organization of security concepts on top
of the system architecture, as well as their traceability
to system artifacts and associated requirements.
To that aim, components are represented by
SysML Blocks, instantiated as so-called Parts in
Internal Block Diagrams, and connected by their
Ports via Connectors. SysML also provides the native
notion of Requirements, which we split between
Customer Requirements and System Requirements.
Both types of requirements can be linked to
architectural components via allocation relationships.
This is a very typical and general infrastructure in
SysML modelling, which we employ in our remote
maintenance case study to support the security view.
In the following section, we shall further use the
concept of SysML stereotypes, which are language
primitives to define custom language extensions, by
allowing the definition of a meta-model on top of the
existing SysML constructs. The elements of the new
meta-model are endowed with specific meaning and
the so-called tags to define their properties. More
information about SysML and its constructs can be
found in the related standard (OMG, 2019).
3.1 Language Extension for Security
A selected portion of our meta-model, showing the
most relevant tags and the relationships between
elements, is represented in Figure 2. The lower part
of the figure (green) represents the model elements of
the Current and Secure Architectures, as defined in
Section 2. They include Customer and System
(Security) Requirements, allocated to architectural
components, implementing traceability relationships
to provide assurance evidence in case of certification
or regulatory compliance. As represented on the
rightmost part, the requirements are fed by the Risk
Mitigations identified as an outcome of the Security
Risk Assessment workflow defined in Section 2.
The upper part of Figure 2 (yellow) represents the
security aspects of our methodology. In particular:
Assets – having a tag named “Intangible Asset
Protection” (IAP), which specifies their impact to
immaterial KPIs such as Company Reputation,
Product Quality, Intellectual Property, and others.
Assets also have “Kinds”, indicating whether they
represent Logical Data, Physical Interfaces,
Software, Storage or Logical State.
Threat Conditions with a tag namedImpact On,
used to indicate whether the threat condition impacts
Confidentiality, Integrity or Availability of the related
asset. The “Operational Phase” relates the threat
condition to system life-cycle or behavioural phases,
such as Installation, Maintenance, Dismissal,
Nominal, Transient, Faulty. Finally, the “Attack
Risk-driven Model-based Architecture Design for Secure Information Flows in Manufacturing Infrastructures
Severity” tag indicates the effect of the attack,
when successful, with values such as Low, Medium,
High, and Critical. The “Involved Asset” relation
indicates the asset involved in the threat condition.
Figure 2: SysML meta-model of the security extension.
Threat Scenarios with two tags associated to
“Attack Complexity”, populated before and after the
identification of risk mitigations, respectively. In the
initial threat scenario, a mitigation might not be
available and the only attack complexity under
analysis is the default one. When a mitigation is
identified, the attack complexity is updated
accordingly with a new, higher value. Values
available for this tag are Low, Medium, High and
VeryHigh. The tag called “Attack path” is (currently)
a textual description of the scenario. The tag “Attack
sources” is populated from a user-defined and
system-specific set of SysML actors, whereas the
“Attack Vectors” are identified as the ports on the
system model. Finally, the “Threat Condition” and
the “Risk mitigation” relations indicate, respectively,
the threat conditions involved in a specific threat
scenario and the and the mitigations in place to reduce
its impact or complexity. For any new mitigation we
expect an update of the “Attack Complexity” tags.
Risk Mitigations - are provided with a tag called
“Effect”, specifying whether the mitigation is
supposed to have Preventive, Detective, Corrective or
Deterrent role on the security hardening of the design.
The “Kind” indicates whether a mitigation is to be
implemented by Technical means, Process means or
by means of a Guideline. Finally, the “Implemented
By” relation indicates the requirements involved in
the fulfilment of a mitigation. This relationship is
populated with links to security requirements, which
stem out of mitigations identified by our workflow.
We note that in or security language extension we
prefer to use abstract values (such as Low, High, …)
over definite numbers or number ranges representing
specific quantities. On the one hand, this allows to
deal with simpler concepts, not requiring deep levels
of detail to be available during design. On the other
hand, this also keeps the space of possibilities
bounded to a limited size and allows to perform the
security assessment at a higher level of granularity.
The linkage between top and bottom areas of
Figure 2 is captured by the relationships of the system
and customer requirements with the security assets
(on the input side) and with the risk mitigations (on
the output side). In practice, this allows the realization
of the workflow of Section 2 and the execution of the
security risk assessment activities in parallel to the
system definition. Thus, our approach enables (i)
traceability between components, (ii) easy navigation
from one artifact to another in the model and (iii) the
representation of the impact of one artifact to the rest
of the system and its components.
3.2 From Modelling to Risk Evaluation,
Mitigation, and Validation
With all relevant security aspects of the system
captured as part of the model, the Risk Evaluation
task can be executed. Automated tools extensions are
used to navigate the model, extract information, and
quantify Risks by a user-defined multi-objective Risk
Evaluation Function (not shown in our meta-model).
For each of the Threat Scenarios, the Risk is
computed by considering attack severity, attack
impact and attack complexity scores (Rocchetto,
Ferrari, & Senni, 2019). Thus, Threat Scenarios can
be ranked by their Risk, and those whose value is
above a user-defined acceptable thresholds are
identified. Risks can further be combined per-Asset or
per-Threat-Condition, to study their cumulative
impact. By analysing commonalities between Threat
Scenarios associated to the same Risk, architectural
weaknesses causing multiple Threat Scenarios are
also identified. In a longer-term vision, this will
enable trade-off analyses and study alternative
mitigation strategies, where cost, risk-reduction,
architecture impact, and new architecture design
needs are all considered.
It is worth noting that, since a full-blown
behavioural system model is generally unattainable
due to the existence of legacy and third-party
components in the manufacturing environment, we
perform the analysis and derive appropriate
mitigations by only using information available to
engineers at a sufficiently high level, without creating
separate behavioural representations of the security
policies or the threat model. Although this step may
become useful once the architecture is consolidated,
we do not see, for now, the need for that enrichment.
bdd [Pa cka
e ] S e cRA [S ecRA _BDD]
IA P :IA P_ T yp e
Kin d:A ss etTy pe
attack_complexity:AttackCom plexity
at tack _so ur ces :Att ac ker
attack_vector: Port
impa ct_on:A ttackImpact
se veri ty:Att ac kS eve rity
involved_as set
kind: ThreatMitiga tionKind
«Associates asset»
<<implemented by>>
«Ass ociates asset»
<<implemented by>>
der ives from
System definition
SECRYPT 2022 - 19th International Conference on Security and Cryptography
As a final activity, the methodology presented in
Section 2 envisions a validation phase, with the intent
of confirming effectiveness of mitigations after
implementation. After this phase, a reassessment of
the security risks may be required, and additional
mitigations may be introduced. The model and the
traceability relationships support consistency, enable
the insertion of new mitigations and a quick efficient
re-assessment of the architecture security. So far, we
have only performed limited sets of validations on our
implemented reference example. We have not yet
exercised the full approach at-scale.
The vision of Industry 4.0 revolves around
connectivity, edge intelligence, and data integration.
Two of the major obstacles to the realization of this
vision are (1) the cybersecurity risks inevitably
introduced by increased connectivity, and (2) the
need of retrofitting legacy equipment, unable to offer
the requested capabilities.
Frequently, Industry 4.0 infrastructures are
structured into layers, where Operation Technologies
(OT) and Information Technologies (IT) reside in
separate networks. The OT segment typically hosts
all the manufacturing equipment, while the IT
segment contains all the enterprise services
(engineering, quality, business, process monitoring
and optimization). This infrastructure, inspired by the
Purdue architectural model (Williams, 1994), divides
the IT layer into three sublayers: one dedicated to the
manufacturing plant operations, one dedicated to the
global and cross-plant operations and another,
external, where stakeholders of the overall
manufacturing ecosystem can collaborate.
Partitioning of each layer into segments is typical, to
mitigate the impact of potential attacks (through
lateral movement). Also, communication across
segments and with the external world is regulated
through firewalls, with stringent authorization rules.
The IEC organization defined the 62443 family of
standards (Schneider Electric, 2018) to provide
guidance in applying cybersecurity best-practices to
manufacturing infrastructures. The core notions of
security promoted by the 62443 are those of Zones
and Conduits. The first notion consists in grouping
assets with similar security requirements and
enforcing boundaries of protection with the external
world. The second notion consists in identifying
communication paths between zones with different
security requirements and enforcing controls on
access and exchanged information.
In this section we consider a practical example of
remote maintenance and discuss some of the
challenges to provide access to the equipment of the
plant while enforcing suitable security policies (in
accordance with the notions of zones and conduits).
The security requirements and mitigations identified
during the security risk assessment determine how the
information flows at different levels shall be managed
securely. The use of an Industrial Gateway as an
architectural pattern is a common practice in
manufacturing - e.g., to guarantee interoperability
among different standards or push computations
closer to the edge. Here we are extending its
application to the enforcement of conduit security
requirements, to provide confidentiality and integrity
of manufacturing data and computations.
As a reference throughout the section, Figure 3
represents the remote maintenance case study. The
orange box represents the boundary of the risk
analysis. It includes endpoint industrial controllers
(subject to maintenance) and an intermediary
gateway. In the Secured Architecture the gateway
hosts the security measures required to regulate the
flow of information to the controllers. Information
flows may be categorized into “low-security”, such as
periodic maintenance, or “high-security” such as
industrial controllers firmware/configuration updates.
Figure 3: Remote maintenance case study.
The following actors will need interact with the
shop-floor devices: (i) the shop floor engineer, in
charge of routine operation of industrial controllers,
(ii) the process engineer, in charge of process
efficiency and manufacturing quality control by
remote interaction with the shop floor devices, and
(iii) the third-party service provider, in charge of
executing (through remote access) maintenance
Risk-driven Model-based Architecture Design for Secure Information Flows in Manufacturing Infrastructures
services, such as execution of diagnostics or firmware
updates of shop-floor devices.
The main security requirement of the case study is
the runtime protection of sensitive data and
computation assets, such as communication
interfaces connecting the gateway and the controllers
and confidential data stored on the gateway, avoiding
unintended interference of third-party activities.
4.1 Method Application
We applied the methodology and modelling approach
described in Section 3 to the remote maintenance case
study. As a first step, we developed a SysML model
(Current Architecture) including actors (shopfloor
and process engineer, third-party service provider)
and main architectural components (industrial
gateway and industrial controllers). The information
flows traversing the industrial gateway are
categorized as: (1) Controllers Diagnostics, (2)
Engineering and Production Data, (3) Controllers
Configuration. We also identified Assets, including
Diagnostic Data (whose integrity is needed for plant
operations), Engineering or Production Data (subject
to confidentiality for IP protection), Configuration of
SW (subject to integrity to guarantee product quality),
and Logs (essential for auditing and security
forensics). In addition, we captured the Security
Policies, specifying what is allowed/forbidden (e.g.,
the flow of Production Data to a third-party service
provider not being allowed). Violation of policies
may cause a damage to one or more assets, realizing
a Threat Condition. Those are captured referring to
Assets and potential events, including (e.g.)
“Diagnostic Data Integrity Compromise”,
“Engineering or Production Data Leaked outside the
company boundaries”, “Configuration of SW
Integrity compromised during Maintenance”. As
prescribed by our meta-model, a Threat Condition has
an associated security impact (Confidentiality,
Integrity, or Availability) and severity (Low to
Critical). The Threat Model is also relevant, as it
describes the entry points used by malicious external
actors, as well as their target Assets.
All information available in the model facilitates
the comprehensive identification of Threat Scenarios,
which describe attack paths (e.g., “An internal user
logs into the gateway as a normal user, bypasses the
access permission mechanism by exploiting
unforeseen information-flow paths”). As prescribed
in our meta-model, Threat Scenarios have an
associated Attack Complexity, ranging from
VeryHigh to Low. Threat Scenarios were
documented in a table within the SysML model and
automatically ranked, using a simple Risk Evaluation
Function defined as a sum of values associated with
the severity, impact, and complexity scores. All
Threat Scenarios with a Risk Evaluation higher than
a critical threshold were selected for mitigation.
The identification of appropriate mitigations was
driven by the analysis of all the critical Threat
Scenarios. Traceability to model elements supported
the identification of some critical sub-functions that
are shared across information flows, subject to
different Security Policies. As an example, different
information flows share the common need of storing
data or SW and retrieving it for later use. Similarly,
both Engineering/Production and Maintenance flows
require access to critical configuration APIs of the
controllers, but with different authorizations. Sharing
such functions/interfaces exposes the system to the
risk of violation of security policies. For this reason,
the Risk Mitigation activity led to the identification
of highly trusted core functions, such as isolation of
process execution and diagnostic data protection.
Security requirements are defined and linked to
those functions: e.g., (r1) Diagnostic and Engineering
Data shall be stored in isolated environments with
non-by-passable access control, (r2) Configuration
APIs access shall be isolated from the main
(untrusted) execution environment. At the software
architecture level (shown in Figure 4), sensitive data
and functions were marked as trusted and placed in
an isolated execution environment endowed with
implementation primitives that we could selectively
use per our methodology as Security Building Blocks.
4.2 Platform Selection
For the enforcement of isolation between the trusted
components of our reference example, we selected a
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) technology.
TEEs are secure domains of computing platforms that
achieve high-assurance isolation by exploiting
hardware-enforced separation and access control. In
this manner, sensitive data and functions can be
stored, processed, and protected to different levels of
security. The use of TEEs guarantees (1) Isolated
execution, (2) Secure storage, (3) Local and remote
Attestation, (4) Secure provisioning and (5) Trusted
path (Vasudevan & et. al, 2012). TEEs offer
protection against software attacks generated in Rich
Execution Environments (REEs), that are full-fledged
environments with less reliable security protection.
To prototype our implementation, we targeted an
Arm hardware architecture, including Arm TrustZone
as a TEE. Since Arm v6 architecture (Pinto & Santos,
2019), the TrustZone technology introduced two
SECRYPT 2022 - 19th International Conference on Security and Cryptography
isolated protection domains (worlds) that the Arm
processors operate in, called secure world and normal
world. We used this technology to run tasks at
different levels of trust (and support the isolation of
information flows), as well as to protect data.
At firmware level, we considered the OP-TEE
framework as a mature supporting solution. OP-TEE
is an open-source framework implementing a TEE on
top of Arm TrustZone for the Arm Cortex-A family.
OP-TEE provides an open-source implementation of
the GlobalPlatform API, currently one of the most
mature industrial TEE specifications.
The architectural model of our case study has been
used to derive (manually, for the moment) the code
structure on top of the OP-TEE runtime. Trusted
components were associated to the TEE primitive of
Trusted Applications, as shown in the SW
architecture in Figure 4. Related assets were mapped
to data items associated to TEE secure storage. Non-
trusted components (e.g., clients for external
interactions) were associated to the primitives of the
REE (Linux), to ensure they did not interfere with the
primitives of the TEE. Finally, ports and connectors
in our architecture were associated to inter-process
communication primitives and those between trusted
and non-trusted components associated to OP-TEE
service calls to uphold the separation between them.
Figure 4: Industrial Gateway software architecture.
In recent years, the concept of secure remote
maintenance has been explored in various works.
(Schwarz & et. al, 2020) propose a hardware-based
solution to isolate sensitive segments of the network
from the broad internet, exploiting hardware
separation between the external maintainer and the
maintenance target. (Kern & Anderl, 2019) exploits a
software defined network (SDN) design, combined
with an attribute-based policy framework, to
implement secure network management during
remote maintenance sessions. (Kasinathan & et al.,
2021) apply a workflow-based approach to model and
enforce access-control on a remote maintenance
scenario. From a security standpoint, those solutions
focus mostly on network and access control. Our
approach, instead, aims at providing information flow
security enforcement by design, at the level of the
system security architecture, exploiting industrial
gateways at the edge and trusted implementation
building blocks, thus being complementary to those.
The literature also offers several graphical and
model-based approaches to support security
assessments (Jürjens, 2002), (Roudier, 2015), (Gluch,
2019). Although similar in spirit, our approach
extends them by proposing an over-encompassing
workflow that aims at deriving implementations that
can be readily assessed realizing system-level
security policies. The CORAS methodology (Lond &
et al., 2011) was the first to link architectural elements
with cybersecurity risk assessment. In the current
work, we enriched a formal architecture modelling
language with security concepts, while CORAS
proposed the use of independent modelling artefacts.
In previous work (Rocchetto, Ferrari, & Senni, 2019)
we investigated techniques for fully automated threat
scenarios generation, although relying on significant
modelling effort and missing the implementation of
security mitigations. (Enoch & et al., 2021)
summarizes approaches for security attacks
modelling, pointing out the need for hierarchical and
compositional approaches, which is one of the
motivations that led us to use SysML. In this work we
adopt a recognized modelling notation, enabling
future automations, and we also support the design
and implementation of security mitigations by using
a specific security technology (TEEs) and pre-defined
security building blocks, reducing end-user effort.
A limited number of works relate information
flow security to the design and verification of systems
leveraging Trusted Execution Environments.
(Gollamudi & Chong, 2016) analysed the use of
enclaves to enforce information flow security policies
against attackers able to inject arbitrary code outside
enclave boundaries. (Gollamudi A. S., 2019) also
analysed the problem of implementing distributed
application using TEEs. Our approach, instead,
supports design trade-offs evaluation as well as end-
to-end security design and validation, in the context
of a model-driven methodology.
In this paper we described a model-based
methodology to systematically analyse and improve
ibd [Block] IndustrialGateway [Industr ialGateway2]
DeviceO perations
Risk-driven Model-based Architecture Design for Secure Information Flows in Manufacturing Infrastructures
the security of manufacturing architectures. The
proposed methodology extends typical architecture
development processes, enriching the system-level
view with a security viewpoint. The methodology
guides the analysis of risks and their sources,
supporting structured mitigation, using trusted
architectural patterns and security building blocks.
The approach is effective if executed at the right level
of abstraction, supporting frequent re-assessments.
We demonstrated the approach on a remote
maintenance case study, showing how the identified
mitigations led to a sufficiently detailed design, apt to
derive a possible implementation. TEE primitives
were used as building blocks to realize isolation and
protection of sensitive data and functions.
One shortcoming of this approach is manifested
by the need of an initial architecture model, which
may be unavailable or costly to build for an existing
manufacturing infrastructure. We plan to explore the
use of automation to extract (parts of) the functional
architecture from network logs, including
components, assets, and information flows.
Another limitation of our approach is the large
space of potential threat conditions and scenarios, due
to the number of attributes and values in our meta-
model. Even in this case, we believe that the use of
automation can help in generating and selectively
addressing threat conditions and scenarios.
Finally, although we consider access to the
manufacturing network by third parties as a central
case study of our application, our method relies on the
assumption that the manufacturing architecture itself
is designed and managed by a single organization. An
interesting extension to our methodology is to use the
architectural model to foster security coordination
across different organizations. This scenario would
require a reformulation of the method, considering
collaboration tools and separation of tasks and
ownerships, which is out of the scope of this work.
This research is founded by the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation program
COLLABS under grant No. 871518.
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SECRYPT 2022 - 19th International Conference on Security and Cryptography