platform economy's de-employment and flexible
labor relations also make it impossible for platform
economy practitioners to obtain the protection of the
current work-related injury insurance system.
3.2 Difficulty of the Platform
Supervision
Some scholars believe that although government
regulation has defects, it still needs government
regulation, and there is information asymmetry in the
market, which is likely to lead to market failure or
market collapse (Akerlof 1970). Compared with the
traditional model, it is more difficult to supervise the
platform economy, and it is tough for the original
government laws and regulations to effectively
restrain it.
At present, there are still many problems that are
difficult to supervise in the process of platform
economic development, such as malicious negative
reviews of platform transactions, platform big data
killing, user data privacy leakage, false propaganda,
traffic fraud, tax evasion by employees, etc. The loose
Internet censorship mechanism and low cost of
dissemination also make supervision more difficult.
Notable among these issues is the leakage of user data
privacy and tax regulation. An important resource for
the operation of the platform economy is user data.
Now platform companies on the market collect, use
and transfer user data without the permission of users,
which brings many problems to government
supervision. For example: On March 20, 2019,
Douyin provided WeChat/QQ platform authorized
login services to affiliated companies, and WeChat
sued it in court. On July 4, 2021, the State Office
released a message saying that the “Didi Chuxing”
APP has serious violations of laws and regulations to
collect personal information. According to relevant
regulations, the Cyberspace Administration of China
notified the App Store to remove the “Didi Chuxing”
APP.
The operation of the platform economy involves
multiple links such as information exchange, demand
matching, paperless digital transactions, and delivery
of goods between two or more parties using the
platform as a medium, which makes it difficult to
determine the elements of the tax system. Regulatory
measures such as access conditions are still
incomplete, which has brought a huge impact on tax
supervision. The form of the platform economy has
brought about major changes in taxation objects and
taxpayers. The platform economy has the
characteristics of virtuality, decentralization, cross-
regional nature, and privacy of transaction data. The
traditional tax supervision model shows lag and
inappropriateness.
3.3 Problem of the Platform Monopoly
The rapid development of the platform economy has
accelerated the monopoly of the market and industry.
"Platform monopoly", that is, the common
phenomenon of "winner takes all" in the platform
economy may evolve into a few monopoly platforms
that maintain the status of winners for a long time.
The platform mainly relies on the Internet. The
platform economy has a strong network effect, and its
initial advantages are amplified. The network effect
of the platform makes the utility obtained by users on
one end of the platform subject to the influence of the
scale of users on the other end. The larger the scale of
users, the stronger the utility with the expansion of
the scale, resources will be gathered to a few
platforms, and the strong will become stronger
(Eisenmann, Parker, Alstyne, 2006). At the same
time, the platform's multilateral market is complex
and the relevant market is difficult to define.
Traditional anti-monopoly methods are not
applicable to platform monopoly issues.
Platform monopolies usually take two
forms: first,
mergers or acquisitions between platforms. After
stable development, platform companies usually
occupy a leading position in the market through price
wars. When price wars are in trouble, platform
companies often form new monopoly platforms in the
form of mergers or acquisitions. The second is the
exclusivity strategy. When platform companies
compete with other competitors of the same type, they
rely on their dominant positions to allow platform
users to "choose one". For example, the two giants in
the e-commerce field, Tmall, and JD. pick one of
two". The platform occupies a dominant position in
the market, which means that the platform has a
priority in terms of pricing,
transaction methods, and
responsibility allocation. The expansion and
extension of the power of the platform make it have
jurisdiction over multilateral customers and key
stakeholders, which means that other participants are
in a relatively weak position, lacking the ability to
bargain and make independent choices, which also
creates a series of problems. The commission is too
high, "big data kills cooked", etc. (Liu, Serfes, 2013).